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Information security has become a vital entity to most organizations today due to current
trends in information transfer through a borderless and vulnerable world. The concern and
interest in information security is mainly due to the fact that information security risk
assessment (ISRA) is a vital method to not only to identify and prioritize information assets
but also to identify andmonitor the specific threats that an organization induces; especially
the chances of these threats occurring and their impact on the respective businesses.
However, organizations wanting to conduct risk assessmentmay face problems in selecting
suitablemethods thatwouldaugurwell inmeeting their needs. This is due to theexistenceof
numerous methodologies that are readily available. However, there is a lack in agreed
reference benchmarking as well as in the comparative framework for evaluating these ISRA
methods to access the information security risk. Generally, organizations will choose the
most appropriate ISRA method by carrying out a comparative study between the available
methodologies in detail before a suitablemethod is selected to conduct the risk assessment.
This paper suggests a conceptual frameworkof info-structure for ISRA thatwasdevelopedby
comparing and analysing six methodologies which are currently available. The info-
structure for ISRA aims to assist organizations in getting a general view of ISRA flow, gath-
ering information on the requirements to be met before risk assessment can be conducted
successfully. This info-structure can be conveniently used by organizations to complete all
the required planning as well as the selection of suitable methods to complete the ISRA.
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walk-through of the organization’s security state. In addition,
it outlines risk scenarios, identifies the consequences, should
these occur, the frequency or likelihood of them occurring,
the possible treatment options, and the associated costs
(Khanmohammadi and Houmb, 2010). However, the main
problem in risk assessment is how to assess all risks so that by
using the output of the risk assessment, these organizations
could define appropriate controls for reducing or eliminating
those risks (Syalim et al., 2009).
Nowadays, there are a number of different types of risk
assessmentmethods, standards, guidelines and specifications
that are available; some of which are qualitative while others
are more quantitative in nature (Saleh and Alfantookh, 2011;
Eloff, 2003). Each of these methods has been developed to
meet a particular need and hence has different objectives,
steps, structure and level of application. However, in general
information risk assessment there are three distinct phases
namely: context establishment, risk identification and risk
analysis (Shedden et al., 2010; Shedden et al., 2009). The com-
mon goals to achieve from these three phases are to create risk
treatment plans and justify the costs of control selection,
development, installation andmaintenance to management.
Dueto theavailabilityofnumerous ISRAmethodscurrently,
many organizations are faced with the daunting task of
determining themost appropriatemethodology based on their
specific needs (Vorster and Labuschagne, 2005). On the con-
trary, the inexistence of one ideal risk assessmentmethod that
would be suitable for all organizations has made the situation
even more cumbersome for end-users (Lichtenstein, 1996).
Furthermore, there are no constructs available to assist orga-
nizations in determining themost appropriate ISRAmethod to
use (Bornman and Labuschagne, 2004). In addition, there is no
standardized and trustable ISRA methods currently in exis-
tence (Syalim et al., 2009; Spears, 2006; Eloff and Eloff, 2005).
There is also no agreed reference benchmark or comparative
framework for evaluating these ISRA methods to assess the
information security risk (Syalim et al., 2009; Saleh and
Alfantookh, 2011; Vorster and Labuschagne, 2005).
In addition, current studies highlight that in order to pro-
tect information assets, organizations need to make compar-
isons between methodologies and decide on the best (Saleh
and Alfantookh, 2011; Vorster and Labuschagne, 2005). This
tedious process leads to unwarranted time,money and energy
consumption. Another ensuing issue here would be the
complexities of using formal methodologies that require a
high level of expertise. In addition, formal methods do not
guarantee the obtaining the list of all the security risk
threatening and control measures.
Although there is a wide range of literature on existing ISRA
methodologies, there is a need for further research in this area
to explore and develop a common info-structure framework in
ISRA to meet the demands in this area. Info-structure is the
layout of information which is organized in a useful fashion
and can be navigated at any time. Therefore, this study em-
ploys a newly developed ISRA info-structure conceptual
framework which anchors on identifying the similarities in
info-structure among the existing ISRA methodologies.
The proposed ISRA info-structure can aid organizations to
establish accurate security planning decisions and enable themto successfully draft correct and consistent planning for the
ISRA process. The info-structure for ISRA explains the general
view of flow, types of information to be gathered and the re-
quirements to be meet before any risk assessment is conduct-
ed. ISRA practitioners can collect all the needed information
and fulfil the requirements based on the ISRA info-structure
before starting with their actual ISRA implementation.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section
describes the background of the risk assessment and ex-
plains six different ISRA methodologies selected for the
comparison. Section 3 explains research approaches used in
this research. Section 4 presents the new conceptual
framework of ISRA info structure, followed by the conclu-
sion in Section 5.2. Literature review
2.1. Background of risk assessment
Information security is of paramount importance to organi-
zations. Literature defines information security as a set of
processes, procedures, personnel, and technology charged
with protecting an organization’s information assets (Jourdan
et al., 2010). It also can be defined as the prevention of, and
recovery from, unauthorized or undesirable destruction,
modification, disclosure, or use of information and informa-
tion resources, whether accidental or intentional (Alnatheer
and Nelson, 2009). The necessity of information security in
organizations has increased because of the enormous
changes in structure and type of information technologies
applied to information creates risks. Risks to assets are iden-
tified in terms of confidentiality, integrity, availability, non-
repudiation, accountability, authenticity and reliability. The
criticality of each risk is rated according to potential impact
and likelihood of occurrence.
Organizations wanting to eliminate the possible risks in
their organizations by conducting information security risk
assessment (ISRA). ISRA able to determine the extent of the
potential threat and the risk associated with an IT system
(Syalim et al., 2009).
An ISRA method identifies an organization’s security risks
and provides a measured, analysed security risk profile of
critical assets in order to build plans to treat the risks
(Shedden et al., 2011; Shedden et al., 2010; Shedden et al., 2009;
Lichtenstein, 1996).
Nowadays, there are a number of different types of risk
assessment process, frameworks and methodologies in in-
formation security literature (Saleh and Alfantookh, 2011).
Table 1 illustrates the list of ISRA methodologies issued by
organizations. All the ISRA methodologies have been devel-
oped along with supporting tools and documentation that
tailor security control implementations to organizations
(Braber et al., 2007; Alberts et al., 2003; Stolen et al., 2002;
Yazar, 2002).
Although these ISRA methodologies differ in their make-
up, order and depth of activities, they generally follow a
three phases: context establishment, risk identification, and
risk analysis (Shedden et al., 2011; Shedden et al., 2010;
Shedden et al., 2009).
Table 1 e List of risk management methodologies issued
by organizations.
Issue by Example
National and International
organizations
a. ISO/IEC TR 13335, 1998;
b. NIST SP800-30, 2002;
c. AS/NZS 4360, 2004;
d. HB231, 2004;
e. BSI Standard 100-3, 2005;
f. ISO/IEC 27005, 2008
Professional organizations a. CRAMM, 2001;
b. CORAS, 2003;
c. OCTAVE, 2005;
d. Magerit, 2006;
e. Microsoft, 2006;
f. Mehari, 2007
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all relevant information about the organization’s industry,
structure, operation, property, current security status, its
overarching strategy, overall goals and long-term strategy
(Shedden et al., 2011; Shedden et al., 2009). In addition, it also
allows the organization to determine the basic criteria, pur-
pose, scope and the boundary of business environment to
ensure that the risk assessment process garners optimal re-
sults and to assure that any risk in the organization’s industry
is identified for rectification.
Risk identification is basically a systematic procedure un-
dertaken to discover and select an organization’s most critical
information assets as well as the identification of the threats
and vulnerabilities of each of these assets.
While risk analysis is the determination of probability:
chance of the threat event occurring and its impact: the cost of
compromising the asset (Shedden et al., 2011). Once the
identification and analysis is done, the organization will then
assign value to each threat that they have identified and
subsequently determine the probability of that threat occur-
ring and also the impact that threat it would have on that
information asset. The integration of probability and impact
will represent the level of risk. This analysis of impact and
probability can be done through qualitative, quantitative or
via a combination of both methods.
Therefore, the ISRA is able to list out a set of threats, of
vulnerabilities, a list of the level of risk and a list of control
measures. However, there are no fixed standards as to how to
develop these lists.
2.2. Information security risk management
methodologies
Although there is a wide range of literature on currently
available ISRAmethodologies, the area needs further research
due to the lack of trustable and standardized ISRAmethods to
enable organizations to select a suitable method. Currently
available methods do not define detailed steps of risk
assessment. As such, organizations have to meticulously
define their own security assessment steps. A general practice
for any organization is to study the methodologies in detail
before a suitable methodology is chosen to conduct the risk
assessment. The process of conducting ISRA will be moresystematic and convincing if organizations have established a
systematic ISRA plan to follow. Basically, properly defined
detailed steps of risk assessment planning can assist the risk
assessment team to conduct risk assessment in a more sys-
tematic and effective manner.
Risk assessment is a fundamental decisionmaking process
in the development of information security and it is a two-
stage process (Lichtenstein, 1996). At the first stage, risk
assessment teams have to define the scope of the risk
assessment, identify information assets and determine and
prioritize risks to the assets. In the second stage i.e. the risk
management process stage, the assessment team makes de-
cisions on controlling the identified risks. Apart from these
two stage, risk assessments also looks at other roles such as
involvement of management in information security decision
making and enabling definition and refinement of security
policy. Thus, it can be said that the risk assessment process
involves a series of tasks broken down by phases where each
phase requires information for its success. ISRA info-structure
is important to serve as a basic guide to the ISRA practitioners
to identify and gather information and define the steps
needed in every phase of the risk assessment.
In a nutshell, concerned organizations undertake various
types of preferred methodologies, depending on their needs,
for comparison when embarking on ISRA in their organiza-
tions. Among them are as follows:
a. Professional organization:
i. CRAMM (Bornman and Labuschagne, 2004; Yazar, 2002;
Sarkheyli and Ithnin, 2010; Enterprise, 2005)
ii. CORAS (Braber et al., 2007; Vorster and Labuschagne,
2005; Bornman and Labuschagne, 2004; Aagedal et al.,
2002; Fredriksen et al., 2002; Raymond, 1993; Lund
et al., 2011; Dahl, 2008; Refsdal, 2011a,b)
iii. OCTAVE (Vorster and Labuschagne, 2005; Bornman and
Labuschagne, 2004; Alberts et al., 2003; Sarkheyli and
Ithnin, 2010; Albert and Dorofee, 2001; Alberts et al.,
2001; Elky, 2006; Visintine, 2003)
b. Research project:
i. ISRAM (Vorster and Labuschagne, 2005; Karabacak and
Sogukpinar, 2005)
ii. Is risk analysis based on business model (Vorster and
Labuschagne, 2005; Suh and Han, 2003)
c. International organization:
i. NIST 800-30 (Syalim et al., 2009; J. T. F. NIST, 2011a;
Stoneburner et al., 2002; J. T. F. NIST, 2011b; J. T. F.
NIST, 2010)
The reason for the selection of various types ofmethods for
comparison is because they have been well documented. The
majority of ISRA methods are proprietary with very little
publicly available information apart from marketing litera-
ture. Often organizations do not have the available capital to
purchase different ISRA methods in order to evaluate them.
Therefore, the evaluation process was often based on docu-
mentation obtained through printed material, presentation
software, demonstration server platforms or internet pub-
lished material.
This info structures for the ISRA were determined by
doing a comparative analysis on the different types of ISRA
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method is given in Table 2 below.3. Research approach
This study developed based on the research approach pre-
sented in Fig. 1 in order to identify the similarities in info-
structure among the existing ISRA methodologies that might
influence the successful planning and implementation of
ISRA in organizations. Altogether six types of methodologies
have been used.Table 2 e Comparison among several types of preferred ISRA
Features
Risk management
methodologies
Developed by Used b
Professional
organization
CRAMM Central Computer and
Telecommunication
Agency (CCTA)
Anyone
CORAS It a research and technological
development project under
the Information Society
Technologies (IST) programme
1. Telemedic
2. E-commer
OCTAVE Carnegie Mellon Software
Engineering Institute (SEI)
Large organiz
(300 employe
or more)
Research project
ISRAM 1. National Research Institute
of Electronics and Cryptology
2. Gebze Institute of Technology
in Turkey
Anyone
IS Risk Analysis Based
On Business Model
(IS RA on BM)
Korea Advances Institute
of Science and Technology
Anyone
International
organization
NIST 800-30 Information Technology
Laboratory (ITL) at the
National Institute of
Standards and Technology
Non-governm
organizations
anyoneThis approach is composed of 6 phases. In the first phase,
we identified a number of currently available ISRA method-
ologies from various literatures. A total of six types of ISRA
methodologies were chosen based on the documentation
which were obtained without any cost implications such as
through related printed material, presentation software,
demonstration server platforms and even internet published
material. Those ISRA methodologies are from Professional
Organization: CRAMM, CORAS, OCTAVE: Research Project:
ISRAM, Risk Analysis Is Based On Business Models and Inter-
national Organization: NIST 800-30.
The ISRA methodologies were then divided into four
features namely, management requirement, establishment ofmethods.
y Risk
assessment
approach
Risk model/Phases
Qualitative 1. Identification and valuation of assets
2. Threat and vulnerability assessment
3. Countermeasure selection and
recommendation
ine
ce
Qualitative Model-based Risk management
process using Unified Modelling
Language: 1. Context Identification
2. Risk Identification
3. Risk analysis
4. Risk evaluation
5. Risk treatment
ations
es
Qualitative 1. Build Asset-Based Threat Profiles
2. Identify Infrastructure Vulnerabilities
3. Develop Security Strategy and Plans
Quantitative 1. Survey-based model: Two separate
and independent surveys are
conducted for the two attributes
of risk namely probability and
consequence.
2. Consists of 7 main steps:
a. First four steps: survey preparation
b. Fifth step: conduction of survey
c. Last two steps: Results are obtained
and assessed.
Quantitative Stage 1: the organizational investigation
Stage 2: asset identification and evaluation
Stage 3: threat and vulnerability assessment
Stage 4: annual loss expectancy calculation
ental
or
Qualitative or
Quantitative
1. System Characterization
2. Threat Identification
3. Vulnerability Identification
4. Control Analysis
5. Likelihood Determination
6. Impact Analysis
7. Risk Determination
8. Control Recommendations
9. Results Documentation
Fig. 1 e Research approach for identifying the similarities
in ISRA info structure.
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vulnerabilities, and risk management improvements. Each
of the main features is divided further into sub features.
Comparison processes were carried out twice. The final phase
was to classify these filtered features into the conceptual
framework of ISRA info structure.4. Conceptual framework of info-structure
ISRA
At the present time numerous methodologies are available
and organizations are faced with the daunting task of
choosing the appropriate methodology for use. Each of these
methods requires complete and adequate information to start
ISRA activities. Small or multi-national organizations require
planning before risk assessment is conducted. Thus, it would
be helpful if the organization knew before-hand what infor-
mation they needed before commencement of the plan. Based
on the analysis, it can be concluded that all the methods
chosen for this comparison required the features of the same
kind of informationwith a slight difference in form. It was also
found that all themethodologies containedmutual features in
the structure.As mentioned in the previous part, two types of compar-
ative studies have been conducted to create the info-structure
for ISRA. In the first step of doing the comparative study, it
was identified that all themethodologies had commonmutual
features. Hence, all the common mutual features in the six
methodologies were listed out. Based on the features, infor-
mation was extracted and included in the respective meth-
odologies. The filled information can either be similar or
different from each other.
Based on the first comparative analyses, it can be concluded
that each of thesemethodologies had been developed tomeet a
specific need thus had a different risk model/phase, steps and
structure, tiers involvement, involvement of people in man-
agement, objectives, ways of information gathering techniques
and level of application. Saleh & Alfantookh (Saleh and
Alfantookh, 2011) concur in opinion. However, the main goal
of all the ISRA is to reduce, mitigate, transfer or accept risks to
an acceptable level by prioritizing and estimating the risk value
(Saleh and Alfantookh, 2011; Straub andWelke, 1998). Hence, it
can be concluded that any organization, regardless of their size,
they have to ensure that the details for the activity listed below
are gathered accurately:
a. Management requirement
b. Establish organizational context
c. Identify assets threats and vulnerabilities
d. Risk management improvement
As the information security department is responsible
for doing risk assessments, it needs to plan ahead before
starting with the actual risk assessment. Basically, the
success of the information security risk management is
fully dependent on the information gathered in order to
make concise and accurate security planning decisions. The
above list is the list of activities in ISRA where prior infor-
mation needs to be sought before proceeding with the three
phases of ISRA known as context establishment, risk iden-
tification and risk analysis.
The second step of the comparative study carried out was
to specify the sub-features for each main feature. In the sec-
ond step of the comparative study, every individual element
of the sub features duly cross-checked andmarked against all
the six methodologies in the table. The features chosen were
based on the highest frequency of “most often agreed” re-
sponses collected from the comparative table found in
Appendix A.
All of the six risk management methodologies concur
that practitioners who are involved in ISRA must have the
skill, qualification, experience and training. This is because
only practitioners who have these characteristics would be
able to collect and analyze information accurately and make
plausible decisions during the evaluation. Before proceeding
with the ISRA however, it is important to get management
input to understand and to ensure that the initial step of
ISRA is correct. Moreover, the risk assessment document
from business and IS/IT departments also need to be
reviewed and revised in order to draw and plan the ISRA
process perfectly.
Below are the sub-activities that should be considered by
ISRA practitioners for management requirement.
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 Needs of business, operation and IT/IS risk assessment
document
 Management input
Among the sub-activities that most risk management
methodologies adopted for organizational context are listed
below.
 Objectives/goals
 Scope and boundary of the security review
 SWOT analysis
 Information about critical assets
 Current security practices/requirement
Each organization has to identify the risks to their most
important assets and build a strategy for protecting its
critical assets. Normally ISRA practitioner will examine
which assets are most important to the organization in the
early process of doing risk assessment. Based on the exist-
ing risk management methodologies, the assets that will be
considered first as important assets for an organization are
listed as below. In practical ISRA, practitioner will usually be
targeting these assets as important assets for their organi-
zation when conducting risk assessments. This list of assets
however, is subject to change whereby, it may increase or
decrease based on the scope of security requirements of an
organization.
 Information asset
 Data assets
 Physical assetsFig. 2 e Conceptual framework Software assets
 Hardware assets
 Personnel assets
ISRA practitioners have to consider the relationships be-
tween critical assets, the threats to those assets, and vulner-
abilities that can expose assets to threats. Fundamentally,
ISRA practitioners will describe security requirements for the
critical assets and identify threats to the critical assets based
on the identified critical assets. Based on the Suh and Han
(Suh and Han, 2003) standpoint, the boundary of risk analysis
should be established during the asset identification to find
out the protection priority of each asset. Perhaps all organi-
zations will have a similar list of critical assets, but the threat
to the asset will vary according to the scope of information
security of the organization.
ISRA methodologies emphasise that a majority of the
risk management methodologies do not provide for risk
management projects that are facilitated by training,
meeting, workshops, updating of risk, risk monitoring
and also reassessment schedule. ISRA is considered as a
continuous process which needs monitoring and contin-
uous awareness the staff. Based on the two comparisons, it
can be concluded that, ISRA management should consider
the following sub activities as a list for risk management
improvement.
 Training
 Meeting
 Workshops
 Reassessment schedule
 Awarenessof Info-Structure for ISRA.
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merging of salient items from both themain and sub activities
listed above.5. Discussion and conclusion
In today’s security environment it has almost become unfea-
sible to offer complete protection to information systems in
organizations. In addition, since there a big numbers of
methodologies are currently available for use; organizations
are still scepticism in choosing the appropriate ISRA methods
for them. Thus, the goal of the present study is focused on the
development of an info-structure for ISRA which explains the
general view of flow, types of information to be gathered and
requirements to be met before any risk assessment is con-
ducted. The conceptual framework of info-structure for ISRA
was developed by comparing and analyzing sixmethodologies
in detail and identifying mutual features in the structure. The
mutual features were then used to form the info-structure for
ISRA.Elements/Features
Profes
CRAMM
Management requirements
Practitioners need to be qualified, experienced and trained O
Needs of business risk assessment document O
Needs of operational risk assessment document 
Needs of IT/IS risk assessment document 
Management input O
Establish organizational context
Objectives/goals O
Scope and boundary of the security review O
SWOT analysis O
Information about critical assets 
Current security practices/requirement 
Information related to the operational/business function 
Schedule and deliverables O
Person who use/support the IT system 
Identify assets threats and vulnerabilities
ASSETS Data asset O
Software asset O
Information asset O
Physical asset O
Personnel/people O
Hardware asset O
Various facilities assets O
Risk management improvement
LACK Training O
Meeting O
Workshops O
Reassessment Schedule/Updating risk O
Risk monitoring 
Awareness O
O-Fulfils criteria.
-Does not fulfil criteria.
?-Could not find in the documents whether fulfils or does not fulfil.The proposed info-structure for ISRA can be used to
complete all the required planning followed by selection of
suitable methodologies to complete the risk assessment suc-
cessfully. To date the info-structure for ISRA has been created
based on comparison studies on available methodologies and
literature review. The researcher assures that further research
will be conducted based on quantitative and qualitative
methods to make the info-structure more complete and
detailed for information security assessment in all types of
organizations.Acknowledgement
Authors would like to thank University Tun Hussien Onn
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sional organization Research project International
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CORAS OCTAVE ISRAM ISRA on BM NIST 800-30
O O O O O
O O O O 
 O O O O
O O O O O
O O O O O
O O ? O O
O O O O O
O O O O O
O O O  O
O O O  O
O   O O
    
    O
? O ? O O
? O ? O O
? O O O O
? O ? O O
? O ? O O
? O ? O O
? O ? O ?
O O O O ?
O O O O ?
O O O O ?
O O O O ?
 O O O ?
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